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Slovak émigrés in North America have played a major role
in the emancipation of their nation from foreign rule in the
last century. Although this process was not always very
smooth, due to the opposition of some of their neighbours,
and also because of internal divisions among Slovaks, both
at home and abroad, nevertheless in 1993 a democratic
and independent Slovak Republic appeared on the map of
Europe. While the proximate causes of the creation of the
Slovak Republic are fairly well-known, the long-term role of
émigrés in North America in this process are not yet fully
appreciated. This paper is a first attempt to sketch the broad
outlines of the role of political émigrés in promoting Slovak
aspirations for independence.
From the 11th to the 19th century the Slovaks lived in the
northern reaches of the multi-ethnic Kingdom of Hungary.
While they seldom suffered from national oppression until
the 19th century, they lacked the opportunity to build na-
tional institutions because they did not control their own
destiny. The official language of the Kingdom was Latin, it
was ruled by the Magyar nobility, and the vast majority of
the people were peasants who were more concerned with
their daily existence than with any national movements. In
the 18th century, however, a small group of Slovak intellec-
tuals appeared, and began to debate their national identity.
Unfortunately, the Slovaks were divided by religion, and this
affected the outcome of the debate. Roman Catholics, who
represented the majority of the Slovak population, by and
large, considered themselves to be a unique and distinct eth-
nic group based upon a common language, homeland (”Slo-
vensko”) and a feeling of kinship. Protestant Slovaks, who75
were a shrinking minority since the Counter-Reformation,
used the ancient Czech Bible and language codification in
their services and correspondence, and, therefore felt a close
kinship with the Czechs. In the 19th century some of them
would seek to create a ”Czechoslovak” identity. A third group,
largely nobles, agreed with Magyar arguments that, even
though they spoke different languages, they were all a part
of the Hungarian nation, which they increasingly equated
with the Magyar ethnic group, and, therefore, they should
assimilate into the Magyar language and culture for the grea-
ter good of Hungary.1
Even though Slovak intellectuals codified their language
in 1787 and 1846, and began to create a literature in this lan-
guage, they continued to be divided on their political future.
The majority became nationalists in the 19th century and
dreamed of home-rule for the Slovaks in Hungary, or, failing
that, complete independence. A smaller group kept alive the
idea that they should unite with their linguistic relatives, the
Czechs, in a re-arranged federalized Habsburg Monarchy.
The third group, derisively labelled ”Magyarones” by the other
two groups, saw no independent future for the Slovaks, and
accepted their eventual assimilation by the Magyars.2
Meanwhile, between 1870 and 1914 approximately
500,000 Slovaks emigrated to the United States and Canada
in search of work. Among them were a few hundred intel-
lectuals, largely clergymen, teachers, or aspiring writers, who
had no future in Hungary because, from 1840 on the official
language of the Kingdom was Magyar, and from 1867 on the
Magyars tried to forcibly assimilate the Slovaks into the Ma-
gyar language and culture. These intellectuals helped to or-
ganize their countrymen into parishes, fraternal-benefit soci-
eties, and they also established a newspaper press for them.
These émigré intellectuals pursued the same political pro-
grammes as their countrymen in Europe: the nationalists wan-
ted home-rule within the Kingdom of Hungary; the Czecho-
slovaks union with the Czechs, and the Magyarones were
satisfied with the ”status quo.” The nationalists were repre-
sented by the Slovak League of America, which was founded
in Cleveland in 1907; the Czechoslovaks were largely mem-
bers of the Slovak Gymnastic Union Sokol, established in
Perth Amboy, New Jersey in 1896; and the Magyarones tend-
ed to be followers of a small group of Magyarone priests from
Eastern Slovakia.3
When World War I erupted in 1914, the nationalists and
Czechoslovaks sprang into action.Both groups urged their
countrymen not to return to serve in the Austro-Hungarian
armed forces, but rather to work for a better future for their
relatives in Europe. By a better future, the nationalists under-
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stood home-rule within Hungary, and they published a Me-
morandum to this effect shortly after World War I broke out.
The Czechoslovaks, on the other hand, hoped for a union
with the Czechs. They responded positively to the urgings of
the Czech professor of philosophy T.G. Masaryk, who was a
leading exponent of ”Czechoslovakism” at Charles IV Uni-
versity in Prague. Masaryk went into exile in 1914 deter-
mined to destroy Austria-Hungary and to create a new state
upon its ruins. The Czechoslovaks in America linked up with
like-minded Czechs and together they prevailed upon the
Slovak League of America to forget about home-rule in Hun-
gary and, instead, to work for the union of the Czechs and
Slovaks in a new state. The leaders of the Slovak League
agreed and, on October 22, 1915, they met with their coun-
terparts in the Bohemian National Alliance and concluded
the Cleveland Agreement by which they pledged to work for
the destruction of Austria-Hungary and the creation of a fed-
eral Czecho-Slovak State, with full autonomy for the Slo-
vaks.4 This Cleveland Agreement was a major victory for the
Slovak Lutheran activist [tefan Osuský, who was subsequen-
tly sent to Europe to coordinate the work of the League with
that of T.G. Masaryk and his followers. Osuský established
himself in Geneva and after the war was rewarded for his
service by being appointed Czechoslovak Minister to Lon-
don in 1919 and in 1920 to Paris, where he remained until the
fall of France in 1940.
T.G. Masaryk, meanwhile, who by 1918 had become the
recognized leader of the Czechoslovak movement in exile,
did not favour home-rule for the Slovaks. He felt that the
Slovaks were a branch of the Czech nation who spoke a dif-
ferent dialect, and he wanted the new state to be strongly
centralized. Therefore, when he came to the United States in
the spring of 1918 to seek American recognition of his move-
ment, and was confronted with the Cleveland Agreement, he
declared it ”out of date.” Instead, on May 31, 1918, he con-
cluded the new ”Pittsburgh Agreement” with the Slovak League
of America. In this watered-down agreement Masaryk was
still forced to promise the Slovaks limited home-rule in the
form of their own Diet, administration, courts, and the use of
Slovak in public life. However, the Pittsburgh Agreement no
longer used the word ”federal” to describe the new state,
there was no mention of the existence of a Slovak ”nation”
and the word ”autonomy” was also left out.5
Masaryk’s true motives in concluding the Pittsburgh
Agreement became clear after the war had ended and Cze-
choslovakia appeared on the map of Europe. The new Con-
stitution of this Republic, which was promulgated in 1920 by
the Czech-dominated Parliament in Prague, proclaimed the77
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existence of a unitary Czechoslovak nation, whose people
spoke a Czechoslovak language, and Slovakia did not receive
its promised autonomy. When asked to comment on the
Pittsburgh Agreement by one of Czechoslovakia’s Prime
Ministers, Masaryk dismissed it as ”one of many pre-revolu-
tionary programs, made beyond the boundaries,” and he
added that ”it was concluded to appease a small Slovak fac-
tion which was dreaming of God knows what sort of inde-
pendence for Slovakia.”6
In dismissing the wishes of Slovak nationalists in
America, and subsequently in Slovakia as well, Masaryk and
his supporters were putting the new Republic into jeopardy.
The various Czech-dominated governments that ruled the
new Republic recruited Slovaks of the ”Czechoslovak” per-
suasion (largely Lutherans) to join their ruling coalition.
American Czechoslovaks approved of this arrangement. Ma-
gyarones in both countries became increasingly irrelevant.
Slovak nationalists, however, were left out in the cold. Or-
ganized in the Slovak People’s Party, which was led by the
Reverend Andrej Hlinka, the nationalists (largely Catholics)
quickly latched upon the Pittsburgh Agreement in demand-
ing autonomy for Slovakia over the next twenty years.7
American Slovak nationalists, still represented by the
Slovak League of America, were joined in the crusade for
autonomy by Canadian Slovak nationalists. In 1932 the latter
organized themselves into the Canadian Slovak League and
the vast majority of its members were also Roman Catholics.
Both groups assisted nationalists in the homeland in their
quest for autonomy. The two Slovak Leagues sent dozens of
Memoranda to Masaryk and to the various Czechoslovak
governments demanding autonomy for the Slovaks. Indeed,
in the summer of 1938, the Slovak League of America sent an
official delegation led by its president, Dr. Peter P. Hletko of
Chicago, with the original of the Pittsburgh Agreement to
Slovakia and demanded that the Agreement be incorporated
into the Czechoslovak Constitution. A coalition of Slovak
nationalist politicians finally proclaimed the autonomy of
Slovakia in the city of @ilina on October 6, 1938, after the
Munich Agreement had demoralized the Prague govern-
ment and reduced the size of the Czechoslovak Republic by
ceding the German-dominated Sudetenland to Germany.8
The Slovaks then elected their own Provincial Diet, which
would make all laws governing their Province, and in this
way finally achieved the autonomy that they had been seek-
ing since the 19th century.
Once the Slovaks had achieved their autonomy within
the re-named Czecho-Slovakia, American and Canadian
Slovak nationalists were satisfied, but Adolf Hitler, the
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Chancellor of Germany was not. In his dream of creating a
”Third Reich,” Hitler was determined to include in it the
Czech provinces of Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia, which for
the previous thousand years had been a part of various
German-dominated empires. Therefore, he set out to destroy
what was left of Czecho-Slovakia, and he made use of certain
Slovak nationalists to achieve his purpose.9 In the six months
of the existence of the second Czecho-Slovak Republic,
Hitler’s agents met with certain extreme Slovak nationalists,
and urged them to declare independence from the Czechs.
After the Prague government heard of these meetings it pro-
claimed martial law in Slovakia in early March of 1939, and
by so doing alienated a great many Slovaks. Taking advan-
tage of this crisis, Hitler summoned the new leader of the
Slovak People’s Party (Andrej Hlinka had died in 1938), the
Rev. Dr. Jozef Tiso, to Berlin, and urged him to declare Slovak
independence or face occupation by the Magyars, who were
allied with Germany, and who wanted to re-annex Slovakia
to Hungary. Tiso refused to unilaterally declare indepen-
dence. Instead, he returned to Bratislava, summoned the
Provincial Diet into session, and explained to its members
what options Hitler had given them. As a result, on March
14th, 1939, the Slovak Diet proclaimed the independence of
Slovakia. Germany immediately recognized Slovak indepen-
dence, and on March 15th occupied Bohemia-Moravia-
Silesia and annexed these provinces to the Third Reich.
Slovakia then became an ally of Germany, was guaranteed its
existence, but had to subordinate its foreign policy to the
Third Reich and its government became increasingly author-
itarian as it adjusted to its domineering patron.10
American and Canadian Slovaks, meanwhile, were
taken by surprise. In the United States Slovak nationalists ini-
tially accepted and supported the Slovak Republic, at least
until the United States entered World War II in December of
1941. After that the nationalists had to suppress their support
for Slovakia because the USA was at war with the Axis pow-
ers and their allies, which included Slovakia. In Canada,
meanwhile, nationalists could never openly support the
Slovak Republic because Canada declared war upon Ger-
many shortly after Great Britain had done so in September of
1939. Indeed, Slovak nationalists in Canada quickly pro-
claimed their loyalty to the Dominion in order to avoid hav-
ing to register as enemy aliens, and to escape possible incar-
ceration, as had happened to several hundred Slovaks dur-
ing World War I. Nationalist Slovaks in both the USA and
Canada also raised millions of dollars for the Allied war effort
in order to demonstrate their loyalty to their adopted coun-
tries. Czechoslovaks in both countries were initially dispirit-79
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ed and dismayed by the breakup and disappearance of
Czechoslovakia.11
Once the United States had entered the war against the
Axis Powers, however, the Czechoslovaks were heartened.
Led by the Slovak Lutheran Vladimír Hurban, former
Czechoslovak Ambassador to the United States, they openly
supported a new liberation movement. It was headed by Dr.
Edvard Bene{, the last president of pre-Munich Czechoslova-
kia, who had fled into exile in early October of 1938. Or-
ganized into various Czechoslovak National Alliances in the
United States and Canada, these groups worked for the
restoration of Czechoslovakia as it had existed before Munich.12
By now, however, certain prominent Slovak Lutherans,
who had initially supported the first Czechoslovak Republic,
broke with Dr. Bene{ over the future shape of the Republic.
Dr. Milan Hod`a, the last Prime Minister of pre-Munich
Czechoslovakia, and Dr. [tefan Osuský, the former
Czechoslovak Minister to Paris, insisted that the resurrected
Czechoslovakia could not be a centralized state, as before,
but had to be federalized in order to satisfy Slovak aspira-
tions for home-rule. Dr. Bene{, who was a student and fol-
lower of T.G. Masaryk, refused these demands. Just like
Masaryk, he considered the Slovaks to be a branch of the
Czech nation who merely spoke a different dialect. There-
fore, both Milan Hod`a and [tefan Osuský broke with Bene{
and Osuský even denounced Bene{ in several pamphlets
published in London.13 After that both Hod`a and Osuský
moved to the United States and supported Slovak home-rule
in any resurrected post-war Czechoslovakia. However, be-
cause most Slovak Roman Catholics in the United States sup-
ported Slovak independence after the war, Hod`a and
Osuský remained isolated from the community and died es-
tranged from it.
The split between Edvard Bene{ and prominent Slovak
Lutherans heartened the Slovak Leagues in both Canada and
the United States. As a result, the Slovak League of America,
led by the Right Rev. Msgr. Francis Dubosh, sent a delegation
to the founding meeting of the United Nations in San
Francisco in 1945 to plead for self-determination for the Slo-
vaks in Europe. The Canadian Slovak League, led by Andrej
Ku~era, supported this move. However, Jan Masaryk, the son
of T. G. Masaryk, and Dr. Bene{‘s envoy to San Francisco
(and future Foreign Minister of post-war Czechoslovakia),
managed to block it.14
After the war, when Czechoslovakia was restored by the
Red Army, the struggle between nationalists and Czechoslo-
vaks took on a new dimension. At the end of August, 1944 a
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dissident Slovak National Council, composed largely of Lu-
therans and Communists, and supported by elements of the
Slovak Armed Forces, staged an uprising against the
Germans and the Slovak Republic. It called for the restora-
tion of Czechoslovakia, but this time on a federal basis, with
full equality for the Slovaks.15 Klement Gottwald, leader of
the Czechoslovak Communist Party, who had spent the war
years in Moscow, and who enjoyed the full support of Joseph
Stalin, even promised the Slovaks in the Ko{ice Agreement of
April 5, 1945, that the Slovaks would have full self-govern-
ment in the form of the Slovak National Council in the res-
urrected Czechoslovakia. However, in three so-called Prague
Agreements concluded in 1945 and 1946, the Slovak National
Council’s powers were quickly whittled down and subordi-
nated to the central government in Prague. Edvard Bene{
and the Communists supported this outcome for different
reasons (Bene{ because he did not recognize the existence of
a Slovak nation; the Communists because they wished to ex-
ert centralized control over the whole country from Prague),
but the result was the same—Slovak dissatisfaction with Prague
centralism.16 This dissatisfaction grew after the Communist
‘coup d’état’ in 1948, followed by the arrest and execution of
some of Slovakia’s Communist leaders, the persecution of
the Roman Catholic Church by the new regime, and the pro-
mulgation of the extremely centralist 1960 Constitution of the
Czechoslovak Socialist Republic which completely emascu-
lated the Slovak National Council and stripped Slovakia of its
national emblem and its national flag.17
Slovak émigrés, meanwhile, even though they had com-
mon enemies in the Communists after 1948, remained divid-
ed in their efforts. Political refugees from the wartime Slovak
Republic fled initially to western Europe and eventually to
Argentina, Australia, Canada and the United States. They
then established competing liberation movements: Dr. Ferdi-
nand ur~anský, the first Minister of Foreign Affairs of the
Slovak Republic, who was removed from office in July of
1940 on Hitler’s orders (he was too much of a Slovak nation-
alist for Hitler’s taste), set up the Slovak Action Committee in
Rome in 1946 in order to carry on the struggle for Slovak
independence. His chief political rival was Karol Sidor, the
former Deputy Prime Minister of the second Czecho-Slovak
Republic, who had been sent to serve as Slovak Ambassador
to the Vatican during World War II because he opposed
Adolph Hitler giving Slovakia orders. Sidor helped to estab-
lish the Slovak National Council Abroad in 1948. ur~anský
and his followers were more aggressive and radical than
Sidor and his group, and for a while the two sides waged a81
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press and pamphlet war against each other. Even though
Sidor died in exile in Montreal in 1953, the two sides kept
sniping at each other throughout the 1950’s. Only when the
Czechoslovak Socialist Republic promulgated its extremely
centralist Constitution in 1960 did the warring factions
decide to stop the hostilities. They finally got together in that
year and created the Slovak Liberation Council. This Council
was co-Chaired by ur~anský in Munich and by Dr. Jozef
Kirschbaum, former Secretary-General of the Slovak People’s
Party, in Toronto, Canada. Kirschbaum had also been forced
out of Slovak politics by the Germans in 1940 and ended up
in the Slovak diplomatic service, stationed first in Rome and
finishing his career as Slovak chargé d’affaires in Switzer-
land. However, the rivalry and bickering that had divided
the two camps in the 1940’s and 1950’s caused so much bit-
terness that the Slovak Liberation Council had very little
impact upon Czechoslovakia or western governments, to
which it appealed for support of Slovak independence on
numerous occasions.18
Meanwhile, many of the post-war political émigrés also
quickly joined the two Slovak Leagues in North America and
worked with them in their support of independence for
Slovakia. In the United States the émigré historians and jour-
nalists Dr. Franti{ek Hru{ovský, Kon{tantín ^ulen, and Dr.
Jozef Pau~o, were elected Executive Secretaries of the Slovak
League of America from 1948 to 1975. In Canada it was
Joseph Kirschbaum who helped to chart the League’s politi-
cal program.19
The Czechoslovaks, meanwhile, who fled their country
after the 1948 Communist ”coup d’état” also organized them-
selves, but, like the nationalists before them, could not main-
tain a united front. The largest group was led by Dr. Joseph
Lettrich, a Lutheran, a leader of the 1944 Uprising, and for-
mer Chairman of the Slovak National Council after the war.
He made his way to to the United States in 1948 and estab-
lished himself in New York City. There he helped to establish
the Council for a Free Czechoslovakia, which rejected Slovak
independence, but insisted upon the full equality of the
Czechs and Slovaks in that state. However, some of his for-
mer colleagues rejected his leadership and political pro-
gramme and established a competing Czechoslovak National
Council in America. Indeed, since several Czech members of
Lettrich’s initial organization refused to recognize the
Slovaks as equals, Lettrich led 17 of his followers out of the
Council for a Free Czechoslovakia and established the Com-
mittee for a Free Czechoslovakia, which was re-named the
Standing Conference of Slovak Democratic Exiles in 1963.
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After Lettrich died in 1968 the leadership of this organization
was assumed by Dr. Martin Kvetko of New York, also a
Lutheran and a former Minister of Agriculture in the post-
war Slovak National Council.20
After the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968,
some of the post-war political émigrés made a final attempt
to unite the various factions active in the West. Grouping
themselves around Stephen B. Roman, the Slovak-Canadian
multi-millionaire, they established the Slovak World Con-
gress in New York City in 1970. The following year they met
once more in Toronto and agreed upon the political platform
of democracy and independence for Slovakia. At the same
time they elected the Greek-Catholic Stephen B. Roman as
their president, the Lutheran minister and post-1968 political
émigré Du{an Tóth as their Secretary-General, the ex-
Communist Slovak Jew Eugen Löbl as a Vice-President, and
the Roman Catholic J.M. Kirschbaum as Executive Vice-Presi-
dent. In this way the Congress sought to present itself as the
representative of all factions of Slovaks the world over. How-
ever, Dr. Martin Kvetko and the Standing Conference of De-
mocratic Exiles, among others, refused to join. Therefore, the
Congress represented only those émigrés and organizations
which supported Slovak independence, and, much as had
the pro-independence organizations that preceded it, the
Congress issued Memoranda and organized meetings all
over the world calling for the overthrow of the Communist
regime in Czechoslovakia, and for the self-determination of
the Slovaks.21
Meanwhile, once the Communists gave up their power
as a result of the so-called ”Velvet Revolution” in Czechoslo-
vakia in November of 1989, the émigrés remained at odds
over the political future of the Republic. Dr. Kvetko immedi-
ately returned to Slovakia and resurrected the post-war
Democratic Party but failed to score any success with the vot-
ers. Representatives of the two Slovak Leagues, on the other
hand, sent official delegations to Slovakia starting in the
spring of 1990 and both groups began to urge Slovak politi-
cians to assert themselves against Prague centralism. The
Canadian Slovak League acted more energetically, largely
because its leadership consisted of more recent political émi-
grés. In any case, both Leagues supported and encouraged
the Slovak road to independence, and both rejoiced when it
happened.22
The Slovak World Congress, however, was initially
divided over Slovakia’s immediate future. Stephen B. Roman
had died in 1988 (and Eugen Löbl even earlier), and that
same year J.M. Kirschbaum was attacked for his support of83
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the wartime Slovak Republic by one of Canada’s oldest
newspapers.23 Therefore, the latter had to withdraw from an
active role in the Congress. Thus, by default, the Rev. Du{an
Tóth emerged as the dominant leader of the Slovak World
Congress.
Once Czechoslovakia threw off the shackles of
Communism in 1989, the Rev. Du{an Tóth sprang into action.
He flew to Prague in December of 1989, expressed his enthu-
siastic support for the ”Velvet Revolution”, and became an
advisor for Slovaks abroad to the newly-appointed Czecho-
slovak President Václav Havel. In this capacity the Rev. Toth
questioned the need for the continued existence of the Slo-
vak World Congress. He also expressed his support for the
continuity of Czechoslovakia, although in a federated form.24
At the next convention of the Slovak World Congress in
Toronto in May of 1990, the assembled delegates disap-
proved of Tóth’s recent actions. Indeed, the delegates voted
him out of office and elected the strong nationalist and ex-
hockey star Marián [astný as their next president. [astný vig-
orously supported Slovak independence and the Congress,
under subsequent leaders, continues to do so.25 However,
Helen Roman-Barber, the eldest daughter and successor to
Stephen B. Roman’s business empire, was dismayed by the
outcome of the May Congress. She had sided with Tóth and
supported the continued existence of Czechoslovakia. There-
fore, in a circular letter addressed to all members of the
Congress in the fall of 1990 she denounced the pro-indepen-
dence stand of the Congress.26 Furthermore, she withdrew
the financial support of the Roman family for the Congress,
and thereby crippled its effectiveness.
Nevertheless, the Slovak World Congress, backed by the
Canadian Slovak League, and the Slovak League of America,
among others, did continue to urge Slovak politicians to
declare independence from Czechoslovakia. All three orga-
nizations were ecstatic when the rejuvenated Slovak Natio-
nal Council (the Slovak Parliament) proclaimed the sover-
eignty of the Slovak Republic on July 17, 1992, and thereafter
the Czechs and Slovaks negotiated their ”Velvet Divorce” as
of January 1, 1993.27 Whether or not appeals from abroad had
any influence on Slovak politicians in voting for sovereignty
remains to be determined.
Thus, the dream of émigré Slovak nationalists for their
own state has finally materialized. Their efforts in liberating
Slovaks in Europe before and during World War I are well-
known and documented. Unfortunately, the activities of
Slovak nationalists on behalf of autonomy or independence
for their homeland in the inter-war period have not been
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adequately studied. Similarly, the story of Slovak émigré
activities on behalf of their homeland after World War II, and
its impact, if any, upon politicians back home, has not been
adequately researched. Now that Slovak archives are finally
open to serious researchers, historians will be able to study
this important chapter in the history of the emancipation of
Slovakia.
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Political Life of Slovakia), in Mikulá{ [princ, ed., Slovenská Liga v
Amerike {tyridsat ro~ná (Scranton: Slovak League of America, 1947),
47-62; for the activities of the Canadian Slovak League on behalf of
Slovaks in Europe see Anthony X. Sutherland, The Canadian Slovak
League: A History, 1932-1982 (Toronto: Canadian Slovak League, 1984),
33-47; for a history of post-Munich Czecho-Slovakia see Theodor
Prochazka, ”The Second Republic, 1938-1939,” in Mamatey & Lu`a,
op. cit., 255-70.
9 For Hitler’s thoughts about expanding Germany eastward see his
Mein Kampf, translated by Ralph Manheim (Boston, Houghton Mif-
flin Company: 1943), 654; for the role of Slovak separatists in de-
stroying Czecho-Slovakia see Prochazka, op. cit., 266-67.
10 Prochazka, op. cit., and Franti{ek Vnuk, ”Slovakia’s Six Eventful
Months (October 1938-March 1939),” Slovak Studies, 4 (1964), 7-164.
11 The activities of the Slovak League of America during World War
II were summarized by Mikulá{ [princ in ”Slovenská Liga v Ame-
rike od 1939 do 1947” (The Slovak League of America from 1939 to
1947), in [princ, op. cit., 63-102; the Canadian story was covered by
Sutherland, op. cit., 38-39.
12 For the World War II liberation movement see Edward Taborsky,
”Politics in Exile, 1939-1945,” in Mamatey & Lu`a eds., op. cit., 322-42.
13 Hod`a’s differences with Bene{ can be found in ”Vyhlásenie
~eskoslovenskej vlády a Hod`ova odpoved nau” (The Proclamation
of the Czechoslovak Government and Hod`a’s Reply), in Dr. Michal
Múdry, Milan Hod`a v Amerike (Chicago: Geringer Press, 1949), 50-
59; Osuský’s polemics with Bene{ include the following: [tefan
Osuský, ”Pízená demokracie” pri práci (Solving the Problem of Demo-
cracy in Practice), (London: The Continental Publishers, 1942),
40pp.; Triedenie duchov nastalo (The Division of Souls has Started),
(London: The Continental Publishers, 1943), 32pp.; and Bene{ a Slo-
vensko (Bene{ and Slovakia), (London: The Continental Publishers,
1943), 32pp.
14 [princ, ”Slovenská Liga ...” op. cit., 89-90; Sutherland, op. cit., 43.
15 For a short history of the uprising see Anna Josko, ”The Slovak
Resistance Movement,” in Mamatey & Lu`a, op. cit., 362-386.
16 The history of this period was covered by Radomír Lu`a in
”Czechoslovakia between Democracy and Communism” in Mama-
tey & Lu`a op. cit., 387-415.
17 The legal standing of Slovakia in the early years of Communist
Czechoslovakia was treated by Jaroslav Chovanec and Peter
Mozolík in Historické a {tátoprávne korene samostatnej Slovenskej repub-
liky (Historical and Legal Roots of Independent Slovakia), (Brati-
slava: Procom, 1994), 42-50.
18 This story has not yet been adequately studied in archival sour-
ces. We do have three different approaches to it: a pro-émigré treat-
ment by Jozef M. Kirschbaum in ”Die Kanadischen Slowaken und
der Gedanke der Slowakischen Selbständigkeit,” in Slowakei (Mün-
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chen), 20 (1983), 172-206; a Communist anti-émigré account by
Ondrej Dányi (pseudonym?) entitled Falo{ní proroci (False Pro-
phets), (Bratislava: Matica slovenská, 1978), 157 pp., and an attempt
at objectivity by Jozef [petko in ”Slovenská exilová a emigrantská
politika v rokoch 1945-1989” (Slovak exile and émigré politics in 1945-
1989), Historický ~asopis (Bratislava), 39 (No.3, 1991), 241-60.
19 Jozef Pau~o, ”Under Dynamic Leadership,” Slovakia (Middletown,
PA), XVII (No.40, 1967), 104-112; Sutherland, op. cit., 70.
20 [petko, op.cit., 246-49.
21 Partly in response to Ondrej Dányi’s diatribe, cited above, J.M.
Kirschbaum wrote a history of the Slovak World Congress covering
the years 1970-1980 entitledDesat rokov ~innosti SKS (Toronto: Slovak
World Congress, 1981), 236pp. Needless to say, the two books reach-
ed completely different conclusions. [petko, op. cit., p.249, reveals
the rejection of the SKS by Matin Kvetko.
22 At the 50th Congress of the Slovak League of America held in
Orlando, Florida in March of 1990, I was elected to the Executive
Board of the League and also a member of a five-person delegation
sent to Slovakia in May to try to steer the new Slovak government
in the direction of home-rule within a federated Czecho-Slovakia,
or else complete independence. Cf. ”Historický 50 kongres Sloven-
skej Ligy v Amerike v Orlando, Fl.” (Historic 50th Congress of the
Slovak League of America in Orlando, Florida), Slovák v Amerike
(Passaic, New Jersey), April, 1990, p.1 and ”Bohatý program delegá-
cie Slovenskej Ligy na Slovensku” (The Ample Program of the
Slovak League of America in Slovakia), Slovák v Amerike, June, 1990,
p.1; ”Samostatná Slovenská republika skuto~nostou” (Independent
Slovakia a Reality), Slovák v Amerike, January, 1993, p.1; and ”Trni-
stou cestou k vítaznej samostatnosti” (The Thorny Road to Trium-
phal Independence), Kanadský Slovák (Toronto), January 2, 1993, p.1.
23 ”The Kirschbaum File,” The Whig-Standard Magazine (Kingston,
Ontario, December 10, 1988), 47pp.; outraged leaders of the Slovak
community responded with several letters to the editor in The Whig-
Standard, January 14, 1989, p.5.
24 Du{an Tóth, ”Torontský prejav” (Toronto Presentation), Bulletin of
the Slovak World Congress (Toronto), XIX (No.86, March, 1990), 4-5.
25 ”Prejav Mariána [tastného” (Marián [tastný’s Presentation), Bulle-
tin of the Slovak World Congress, XIX (No.90, February, 1991), p.11.
26 Circular letter by Helen Roman to all members of the Slovak
World Congress, October 10, 1990, in the author’s possession.
27 ”Deklarácia Slovenskej národnej rady o zvrchovanosti SR” (The
Proclamation of Sovereignty by the Parliament of the Slovak Re-
public), Slovák v Amerike, August, 1992, p.1; ”Slováci, radujme sa!”
(Slovaks, Rejoice!), Kanadský Slovák, July 25, 1992, p.1; ”Pozdrav
slovenskému národu, jeho Národnej rady a vlade Slovenskej repub-
liky” (Greetings to the Slovak Nation, its Parliament and the Govern-
ment of the Slovak Republic), Bulletin of the Slovak World Congress,
XXII (No.91, January, 1993), p.1.
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Uloga slova~kih iseljenika u Sjevernoj
Americi u osloba|anju slova~ke zemlje
M. Mark STOLARIK
Sveu~ili{te Ottawa, Ottawa
Slova~ki iseljenici u Sjevernoj Americi odigrali su va`nu
ulogu u osloba|anju svoje zemlje od tu|inske vlasti u XIX.
stolje}u. Iako ovaj proces nije uvijek tekao glatko,
zahvaljuju}i suprotstavljanju nekih susjednih zemalja, a i
zbog unutarnjih podjela me|u Slovacima i u domovini i u
inozemstvu, ipak se 1993. godine demokratska i nezavisna
Slova~ka Republika pojavila na karti Europe. Dok su
neposredni razlozi stvaranja Slova~ke Republike uglavnom
dobro znani, dugoro~na uloga iseljenika Sjeverne Amerike u
tom procesu nije do kraja ocijenjena. Ovaj rad prvi je
pokušaj izrade obrisa uloge politi~kih iseljenika u
promicanju slova~kih te`nji za nezavisnoš}u.
Die Rolle slowakischer Auswanderer
in Nordamerika bei der Befreiung
der Slowakei
M. Mark STOLARIK
Universität Ottawa, Ottawa
Die slowakischen Auswanderer in Nordamerika spielten bei
der Befreiung ihres Landes von der Fremdherrschaft im 19.
Jahrhundert eine wichtige Rolle. Obwohl dieser Prozeß nicht
immer reibungslos vonstatten ging, wobei die inneren
Zerwürfnisse zwischen den Slowaken im In- und Ausland
nicht wenig beitrugen, ist auf der politischen Karte Europas
im Jahre 1993 die demokratische und unabhängige
Slowakische Republik erschienen. Während die
unmittelbaren Gründe für die Entstehung der Slowakischen
Republik mehr oder weniger bekannt sind, steht eine
Bewertung der historischen Rolle der nordamerikanischen
Slowaken bei diesen Vorgängen immer noch aus. Dieser
Artikel ist ein erster Versuch, die Rolle der politischen
Auswanderer, die die Unabhängigkeitsbestrebungen der
Slowaken propagierten, zu umreißen.
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